In February and March of 1999, we surveyed 392 CFOs about the cost of capital, capital budgeting, and capital structure. The survey consisted of 14 main questions, most with subparts -over 100 questions in total. Although the survey was anonymous, we also collected information on 12 characteristics of the firms and management. We asked questions about firm size, foreign sales, industry, CEO education, age of the CEO, CEO tenure, ownership, whether they paid dividends, whether they were regulated, and the proportion of common stock that the top three executives owned if all their options were exercised. We also collected information on debt-equity ratios and debt ratings. The analysis was published in the 2001 Journal of Financial Economics (http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=220251) showed that many survey responses differed by the firm and management characteristics.
Introduction
In our 2001 Journal of Financial Economics article, "The Theory and Practice of Corporate Finance: Evidence from the Field," we conducted a comprehensive survey that describes the current practice of corporate finance. Our goal was to provide insights allowing researchers to use our results to develop new theories --and potentially modify or abandon existing views. We also hoped that practitioners would learn from our analysis by noting how other firms operate and by identifying areas where academic recommendations have not been fully implemented. The survey paper is available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=220251.
We now release the full dataset. For any given question, our initial paper performed univariate analysis on responses differentiated by firm and manager characteristics. However, we performed very little analysis that linked the responses across questions. The release of our data makes it possible to analyze the response to one question conditional on the responses of another or a series of other questions. The question-conditional analysis could be very useful in shedding insights on some testable implications of a number of theories in corporate finance.
Our survey differed from previous surveys in a number of dimensions. First, the scope of our survey was broad. We examined capital budgeting, cost of capital, and capital structure. We explored each category in depth, asking more than 100 total questions in total.
Second, we sampled a large cross-section of approximately 4,440 firms. In total, 392 chief financial officers responded to the survey, for a response rate of 9%. We investigated for possible nonresponse bias and concluded that our sample is representative of the population.
Third, we analyzed the responses conditional on firm characteristics. We examined the relation between the executives' responses and firm size, P/E ratio, leverage, credit rating, dividend policy, industry, management ownership, CEO age, CEO tenure, and the education of the CEO. By testing whether responses differ across these characteristics, we shed light on the implications of various corporate finance theories related to firm size, risk, investment opportunities, transaction costs, informational asymmetry, and managerial incentives.
Survey-based analysis complements other research based on large samples and clinical studies. Large sample studies are the most common type of empirical analysis, and have several advantages over other approaches. Most large-sample studies offer, among other things, statistical power and cross-sectional variation. However, large-sample studies often have weaknesses related to variable specification and the inability to ask qualitative questions. Clinical studies are less common but offer excellent detail and are unlikely to "average away" unique aspects of corporate behavior. However, clinical studies use small samples and their results are often sample-specific.
The survey approach offers a balance between large sample analyses and clinical studies. Our survey analysis was based on a moderately large sample and a broad cross-section of firms. At the same time, we were able to ask very specific and qualitative questions. The survey approach is not without potential problems, however. Surveys measure beliefs and not necessarily actions. Survey analysis faces the risk that the respondents are not representative of the population of firms, or that the survey questions are misunderstood. Until our research, survey analysis was seldom used in corporate financial research. Part of the reason for our releasing the data is that we feel that our paper provides unique information to aid our understanding of how firms operate -and there is more research to do with the data.
Survey Method

Design
Our survey focused on three areas: capital budgeting, cost of capital, and capital structure. Based on a careful review of the existing literature, we developed a draft survey that was circulated to a group of prominent academics for feedback. We incorporated their suggestions and revised the survey. We then sought the advice of marketing research experts on the survey design and execution. We made changes to the format of the questions and overall survey design with the goal of minimizing biases induced by the questionnaire and maximizing the response rate.
The survey project was a joint effort with the Financial Executives International (FEI), which at the time was known as Financial Executives Institute. At the time, FEI had approximately 14,000 members that held policy-making positions as CFOs, treasurers, and controllers at 8,000 companies throughout the U.S. and Canada. Since 1996, Duke University and the FEI poll on a quarterly basis these financial officers with a one-page survey on important topical issues. The usual response rate for the quarterly survey is 8-10%.
Using the penultimate version of the survey, we conducted beta tests at both FEI and Duke University. This involved having graduating MBA students and financial executives fill out the survey, note the required time, and provide feedback. Our beta testers took, on average, 17 minutes to complete the survey. Based on this and other feedback, we made final changes to the wording on some questions. The final version of the survey contained 15 questions, most with subparts, and was three pages long. One section collected demographic information about the sample firms.
The survey instrument appears on the Internet at the address http://faculty.fuqua.duke.edu/~charvey/Research/GHSurvey/Survey_instrument.pdf We sent out two different versions with questions 11-14 and questions 1-4 interchanged. We were concerned that the respondents might fill in the first page or two of the survey but leave the last page blank. If this were the case, we would expect to see a higher proportion of respondents answering the questions that appear at the beginning of either version of the survey. We found no evidence that the response rate differs depending on whether the questions are at beginning or the end of the survey.
Delivery and response
We used two mechanisms to deliver the survey. We sent a mailing from Duke University on February 10, 1999 to each CFO in the 1998 Fortune 500 list. Independently, the FEI faxed out 4,440 surveys to their member firms on February 16, 1999. Three hundred thirteen of the Fortune 500 CFOs belong to the FEI, so these firms received both a fax and a mailed version. We requested that the surveys be returned by February 23, 1999. To encourage the executives to respond, we offered an advanced copy of the results to interested parties.
We employed a team of ten MBA students to follow up on the mailing to the Fortune 500 firms with a phone call and possible faxing of a second copy of the survey. On February 23, FEI refaxed the survey to the 4,440 FEI corporations and we remailed the survey to the Fortune 500 firms, with a new due date of February 26, 1999. This second stage was planned in advance and designed to maximize the response rate.
The executives returned their completed surveys by fax to a third-party data vendor. Using a third party ensures that the survey responses are anonymous. We feel that anonymity is important to obtain frank answers to some of the questions. Although we do not know the identity of the survey respondents, we do know a number of firm-specific characteristics, as discussed below.
Three hundred ninety-two completed surveys were returned, for a response rate of nearly 9%. Given the length (three pages) and depth (over 100 questions) of our survey, this response rate compares favorably to the response rate for the quarterly FEI-Duke survey. The rate is also comparable to other recent academic surveys.
Firm and management characteristics
Fig. 1 presents summary information about the firms in our sample. The companies range from very small (26% of the sample firms have sales of less than $100 million) to very large (42% have sales of at least $1 billion) (see Fig. 1A ). In subsequent analysis, we refer to firms with revenues greater than $1 billion as "large." Forty percent of the firms are manufacturers (Fig. 1C) . The nonmanufacturing firms are evenly spread across other industries, including financial (15%), transportation and energy (13%), retail and wholesale sales (11%), and hightech (9%). In the Appendix, we show that the responding firms are representative of the corporate population for size, industry, and other characteristics.
The median price-earnings ratio is 15. Sixty percent of the respondents have price-earnings ratios of 15 or greater (Fig. 1D) . We refer to these firms as growth firms when we analyze how investment opportunities affect corporate behavior. We refer to the remaining 40% of the respondents as nongrowth firms.
The distribution of debt levels is fairly uniform (Fig. 1E ). Approximately one-third of the sample firms have debt-to-asset ratios below 20%, another third have debt ratios between 20% and 40%, and the remaining firms have debt ratios greater than 40%. We refer to firms with debt ratios greater than 30% as highly levered. The creditworthiness of the sample is also dispersed (Fig. 1F ). Twenty percent of the companies have credit ratings of AA or AAA, 32% have an A credit rating, and 27% have a BBB rating. The remaining 21% have speculative debt with ratings of BB or lower.
Though our survey respondents are CFOs, we asked a number of questions about the characteristics of the chief executive officers. We assume that the CFOs act as agents for the CEOs. Nearly half of the CEOs for the responding firms are between 50 and 59 years old (Fig.  1I ). Another 23% are over age 59, a group we refer to as "mature." Twenty-eight percent of the CEOs are between the ages of 40 and 49. The survey reveals that executives change jobs frequently. Nearly 40% of the CEOs have been in their jobs less than four years, and another 26% have been in their jobs between four and nine years ( Fig. 1J) . We define the 34% who have been in their jobs longer than nine years as having "long tenure." Forty-one percent of the CEOs have an undergraduate degree as their highest level of educational attainment (Fig. 1K) . Another 38% have an MBA and 8% have a non-MBA masters degree. Finally, the top three executives own at least 5% of the common stock of their firm in 44% of the sample. These CEO characteristics allow us to examine whether managerial incentives or entrenchment affect the survey responses. We also study whether having an MBA affects the choices made by corporate executives. Fig. 1M shows that 36% of the sample firms seriously considered issuing common equity, 20% considered issuing convertible debt, and 31% thought about issuing debt in foreign markets. Among responding firms, 64% calculate the cost of equity, 63% have publicly traded common stock, 53% issue dividends, and 7% are regulated utilities (Fig. 1N ). If issuing dividends is an indication of a reduced informational disadvantage for investors relative to managers, the dividend issuance dichotomy allows us to examine whether the data support corporate theories based on informational asymmetry.
How representative was our sample?
Although we do not have reliable information about the dividend policies, P/E ratios, sales revenue, or debt ratios for the FEI population, our analysis relied heavily on these variables, so we performed Monte Carlo simulations to determine the representativeness of our sample. Specifically, we take a random sample of 392 firms from the Compustat database, stratifying on the number of employees in FEI firms. That is, we sample from Compustat so that 15.4% of the draws are from firms with at least 20,000 employees, 24.7% are from firms with between 5,000 and 19,999 employees, etc., because these are the percentages for the FEI population. We then calculate the mean debt ratio, sales revenue, and P/E ratio (ignoring firms with negative earnings), and the percentage of firms that pay dividends for the randomly drawn firms. We repeat this process 1,000 times to determine an empirical distribution of mean values for each variable. We then compare the mean values for our sample to the empirical distribution. If, for example, the mean debt ratio for the responding firms is larger than 950 of the mean debt ratios in the Monte Carlo simulation, we would conclude that there is statistical evidence that respondent firms are more highly levered than are firms in the overall population.
The sample values for sales revenue and debt ratios fall comfortably near the middle of the empirical distributions, indicating that the sample is representative for these two characteristics. The mean P/E ratio of 17 for the sample is statistically smaller than the mean for the Compustat sample (overall mean of approximately 20). Fifty-four percent of the sample firms pay dividends, compared to approximately 45% in the stratified Compustat sample. Although the sample and population differ statistically for these last two traits, the economic differences are small enough to indicate that our sample is representative of the population from which it is drawn. There are at least three reasons why our Monte Carlo experiment might indicate statistical differences, even if our sample firms are actually representative of the FEI population: 1) there are systematic differences between the Compustat and FEI populations not controlled for with the stratification based on number of employees, 2) the stratification is based on FEI firms only, although the survey "oversamples" Fortune 500 firms, and 3) we deleted firms with negative P/E ratios in the Monte Carlo simulations, although survey respondents might have entered a P/E ratio of zero or something else if they had negative earnings.
Finally, given that much corporate finance research analyzes Compustat firms, we repeat the Monte Carlo experiment without stratifying by number of employees. That is, we randomly draw 392 firms (1,000 times) from Compustat without conditioning on the number of employees. This experiment tells us whether our sample firms adequately represent Compustat firms, to provide an indication of how directly our survey results can be compared to Compustat-based research. The mean debt ratio, sales revenue, and P/E ratios are not statistically different from the means in the Compustat data; however, the percentage of firms paying dividends is smaller than for the overall Compustat sample. Aside from dividend payout, the firms that responded to our survey are similar to Compustat firms.
Other issues with survey data
If one accepts that nonresponse bias is small, there are still concerns about survey data. For one thing, the respondents might not answer truthfully. Given that the survey is anonymous, we feel this problem is minimal. Moreover, our assessment from the phone conversations is that the executives would not take the time to fill out a survey if their intent was to be untruthful.
Another potential problem with survey data is that the questions, no matter how carefully crafted, either might not be properly understood or might not elicit the appropriate information. For example, Stigler (1966) asks managers if their firms maximize profits. The general response is that, no, they take care of their employees, are responsible corporate citizens, etc. However, when Stigler asks whether the firms could increase profits by increasing or decreasing prices, the answer is again no. Observations such as these can be used to argue that there is some sort of "economic Darwinism," in which the firms that survive must be doing the proper things, even if unintentionally. Or, as Milton Friedman (1953) notes, a good pool player has the skill to knock the billiards balls into one another just right, even if he or she cannot solve a differential equation. Finally, Cliff Smith tells about a chef who, after tasting the unfinished product, always knew exactly which ingredient to add to perfect the day's recipe, but could never write down the proper list of ingredients after the meal preparation was complete. These examples suggest that managers might use the proper techniques, or at least take the correct actions, even if their answers to a survey do not indicate so. If other firms copy the actions of successful firms, then it is possible that many firms take appropriate actions without thinking within the box of an academic model. This set of critiques is impossible to completely refute. We have attempted to be very careful when designing the questions on the survey. We also feel that by contrasting the answers conditional on firm characteristics, we should be able to detect patterns in the responses that shed light on the importance of different theories, even if the questions are not perfect in every dimension. Ultimately, however, the analysis we perform and conclusions we reach must be interpreted keeping in mind that our data are from a survey. Having said this, we feel that these data are representative and provide much unique information that complements what we can learn from traditional large-sample analysis and clinical studies. Moreover, a better understanding of management beliefs is helpful when interpreting possible causality in theoretical models and large-scale empirical analysis.
The variation in executive and firm characteristics permits a rich description of the practice of corporate finance, and allowed us to infer whether corporate actions are consistent with academic theories. What was missing in our analysis was question-conditional analysis. Are the response to certain questions correlated with responses to other questions and how do these correlations vary across respondents? This type of analysis allows for a deeper examination of the foundations and predictions of many theories in corporate finance. Table 1 describes the fields of an excel file which contains the raw data. The data can be obtained at:
Data
http://faculty.fuqua.duke.edu/~charvey/Research/GHSurvey/GH_JFE2001.XLS Each row in the matrix represents a respondent. Each column is a coded response to a question. Table 1 exactly reproduces the wording that was used on the survey (including same emphasis, line breaks, and fonts). The first column in Table 1 lists the column field in the main excel datasheet. The second column lists the items or specific responses to particular questions. Again, the wording is exactly as it was on the original survey. The third column of Table 1 details the format of the response, as well as any missing value codes.
Other resources
A copy of the original working paper posted on the SSRN can be obtained at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=220251
A copy of the powerpoint deck that we used in seminar presentations is available at:
http://faculty.fuqua.duke.edu/~charvey/Research/GHSurvey/GH_JFE2001_graphs.ppt A copy of the original powerpoint deck for the Harvard/JFE conference is available at:
http://faculty.fuqua.duke.edu/~charvey/Research/GHSurvey/GH_JFE2001_seminar.ppt A copy of our new survey of 384 CFOs on dividend and repurchase policy is available at: http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=358582
Conclusions
While there have been many surveys conducted in finance, only a few have made it into the main stream of theoretical and empirical finance. Our survey is distinguished by its large sample size, its broad scope, and the availability of firm-and manager-specific characteristics. We hope that the release of our original data set will allow for more subtle examinations of existing theoretical models and, perhaps, spur new research.
Table 1
Documentation for "The theory and practice of corporate finance: Evidence from the field" AP a) we issue short-term when short-term interest rates are low compared to long-term rates 0-4, 9=missing AQ b) matching the maturity of our debt with the life of our assets 0-4, 9=missing AR c) we issue short-term when we are waiting for long-term market interest rates to decline 0-4, 9=missing AS d) we borrow short-term so that returns from new projects can be captured more fully by shareholders, rather than committing to pay long-term profits as interest to debtholders 0-4, 9=missing
Column
AT e) we expect our credit rating to improve, so we borrow shortterm until it does 0-4, 9=missing AU f) borrowing short-term reduces the chance that our firm will want to take on risky projects 0-4, 9=missing AV g) we issue long-term debt to minimize the risk of having to refinance in "bad times"
0-4, 9=missing AW h) Other 9=missing
Question 6 What is your firm's approximate (trailing) Price/Earnings ratio over the past 3 years? ______ (e.g., 18) AX P/E ratio F4.2, -1.00=missing
Question 7
What is the credit rating for your firm's debt? Write NONE if debt not rated _______ (e.g., AA-, B+) 
AY
BQ Yes or No
Yes=1, No=2, 9=missing BR a) if our stock price has recently risen, the price at which we can sell is "high" 0-4, 9=missing, -1=if answered "no" BS b) stock is our "least risky" source of funds 0-4, 9=missing, -1=if answered "no" BT c) providing shares to employee bonus/stock option plans 0-4, 9=missing, -1=if answered "no" BU d) common stock is our cheapest source of funds 0-4, 9=missing, -1=if answered "no" BV e) maintaining a target debt-to-equity ratio 0-4, 9=missing, -1=if answered "no" BW f) using a similar amount of equity as is used by other firms in our industry 0-4, 9=missing, -1=if answered "no" BX g) whether our recent profits have been sufficient to fund our activities 0-4, 9=missing, -1=if answered "no" BY h) issuing stock gives investors a better impression of our firm's prospects than issuing debt 0-4, 9=missing, -1=if answered "no" BZ i) the capital gains tax rates faced by our investors (relative to tax rates on dividends) 0-4, 9=missing, -1=if answered "no" CA j) diluting the holdings of certain shareholders 0-4, 9=missing, -1=if answered "no" CB k) the amount by which our stock is undervalued or overvalued by the market 0-4, 9=missing, -1=if answered "no" CC l) inability to obtain funds using debt, convertibles, or other sources 0-4, 9=missing, -1=if answered "no" CD m) earnings-per-share dilution 0-4, 9=missing, -1=if answered "no" CE n) Other 9=missing 
